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Regulating the environmental impact of oil and gas activities in the
exclusive economic zone and extended continental shelf
In this article Ceri Warnock discusses the implications of the Exclusive Economic Zone
(Environmental Effects) Bill 2011 andwhether it is capable of protecting New Zealand’s oceans
from the risk of oil and gas activities. Ceri Warnock is a Senior Lecturer at Otago University.
Introduction
There can be little doubt that the Deepwater Horizon
disaster catalysed the present governmental action directed
towards the environmental management of New Zealand’s
oceans. The suggestions of an environmental permitting
regime for the exclusive economic zone and extended
continental shelf (EEZ-ECS) had been languishing at the
policy development stage for over a decade before the
oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. But the Exclusive Economic
Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Bill
2011 (the Bill) is now before Parliament and it is
envisaged that the legislation will be brought into force
before the end of 2012. This brief article considers
whether the proposed legislation appears capable of
improving the environmental protection of New Zealand’s
oceans from the risks inherent in oil and gas activities,
and in particular whether the reforms are likely to do
anything to minimise the prospects of an accidental oil
spill.
Present regime
At present, the environmental effects of oil and gas activi-
ties that take place within the territorial sea are regulated
by the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA), but activi-
ties taking place beyond the 12 nm limit are subjected to a
more limited environmental management regime. In simple
terms, an operator wishing to conduct petroleum activities
in the EEZ-ECS must obtain a prospecting, exploration or
mining permit from the Minister of Energy. In deciding
whether to grant any permit, the Crown Minerals Act 1991
(CMA) regime requires theMinister to focus uponmaximis-
ing the efficient exploitation of the petroleum resource.1
Little consideration is given to environmental matters at
this stage and indeed there are no regulatory requirements
for environmental protection to be factored into the decision-
making. The Ministry for the Environment and Maritime NZ
issued “Environmental Best Practice Guidelines for the
Offshore Petroleum Industry” in March 2006, but these
guidelines are described as “voluntary principles” and “are
not intended to be legally enforceable”. The only principle
in the Guidelines that contains any clear procedural mea-
sure, places the onus verymuch on industry self-regulation:
5.1 Environmental Assessment Operators shall under-
take an environmental assessment to address significant
potential impacts on themarine environment. TheOpera-
tor will develop strategies, procedures and practices to
manageormitigate thosespecific impactsof their activities.
Upon granting a CMA permit, the Minister can place any
condition he sees fit on that permit2 and theoretically this
could include conditions relevant to environmental manage-
ment, but this has not been the approach adopted thus far.
The standard conditions simply refer back to industry prac-
tice by requiring the holder tomake “all reasonable efforts”
to operate in accordance with “good exploration and min-
ing practice”.3 For completeness, the Maritime Transport
Act 1994 (MTA)makes the deliberate dumping or discharge
of waste from offshore installations, in the absence of
express permission, an offence, and s 8(1) of the Continen-
tal Shelf Act 1964 empowers the Governor-General tomake
regulations that could promote the environmental protec-
tion of this area, but none have ever been made.
The regulatory regime addressing liability in the event of
a spill is more developed. Rule 102 of the Marine Protection
Rules requires all operators to hold liability insurance of
NZ$30million before commencing operation inNewZealand
waters (although to place this sum in context, BP has set
aside US$41 billion to date to cover clean-up costs and
liability flowing from the Deepwater Horizon spill); the MTA
requires all operators to prepare a discharge management
plan that outlines emergency procedures to be taken; and
Maritime NZ operates a national oil spill response strategy.
Perhaps the primary regulatory measures that promote
environmental protection of the EEZ-ECS, albeit in an indi-
rect way, concern the integrity of offshore installations: rigs
must be designed and constructed in accordance with
generally accepted and appropriate industry practice4 and
must carry a valid certificate of fitness, assessed by an
accredited inspector quinquennially.5 Operators also have
to comply with the provisions of the Health and Safety in
Employment (Petroleum Exploration and Extraction) Regu-
lations 1999 in preparing a “Safety Case” for offshore
installations. A “Safety Case” is standard industry practice
and ensures the collation of comprehensive information on
safety measures relevant to the specific vessel or installa-
tion.
To summarise, the existing legislative framework focuses
primarily on the aftermath of an accidental discharge and
minimal regulatory attention is directed to the active pre-
vention of environmental damage. That such an approach
to the environmental protection of our oceans is inad-
equate cannot seriously be challenged.
New proposals
The Bill proposes to change this situation by introducing an
environmental permitting regime for activities undertaken
in the EEZ-ECS. An explanation of the Bill was provided by
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Vernon Rive the previous issue of BRMB6 but there are
certain features worthy of specific attention in the context
of petroleum exploration and exploitation.
The first point concerns the classification of activities. At
this stage in the reform process it is unclear how oil and gas
activities will be classified for the purposes of permitting. It
is possible that prospecting activities and exploratory activi-
ties such as seismic surveying will be permitted subject to
the operator meeting certain standards (for example, stan-
dards based upon the “Guidelines for Minimising Acoustic
Disturbance toMarineMammals fromSeismic SurveyOpera-
tions”) but it is extremely likely that exploratory well-
drilling and full-scale production will attract discretionary
activity status and require consent.7
An interesting question arises therefore as to whether
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will take into
account the inherent risks of a spill, present with all deep-
sea drilling, but a risk that becomes more acute in the
treacherous waters of New Zealand’s EEZ. The Bill contains
a definition of effects that replicates s 3 of the RMA and so,
in determining whether to grant consent, the EPA is man-
dated to consider “any potential effect of low probability
which has a high potential impact”. Given that the statutory
wording is identical in cl 6 of the Bill and s 3 of the RMA, a
fair assumption is that the case law on risk developed by the
Environment Court will guide the EPA. In Shirley Primary
School v Christchurch City Council [1999] NZRMA 66
(at [142]), the Environment Court determined that a “scin-
tilla of evidence” pointing towards a “real risk” was suffi-
cient to factor a risk into decision-making. If the EPA were
to adopt this test, it would be extraordinary if the risks of a
spill were not taken into account in every application con-
cerning deep-sea drilling for petroleum. But the new regime
is far from risk-averse.Whilst the risk of a spill may be taken
cognisance of, it is unlikely to prove determinative because
of the purpose of the Bill and the tests for consent. The
purpose is contained in clause 10 and provides that:
The Act seeks to achieve a balance between the protec-
tion of the environment and economic development in
relation to activities in the exclusive economic zone and
on the continental shelf.
In considering whether to grant consent, and once all the
potential effects of the activity have been assessed, the EPA
may—
(a) grant an application for marine consent, in whole or
in part, and issue a consent if the activity’s contribu-
tion to New Zealand’s economic development out-
weighs theactivity’sadverseeffectsontheenvironment;
or
(b) refuse the application if the adverse effects of the
activity on the environment outweigh the activity’s
contribution toNewZealand’seconomicdevelopment.8
Whilst this is described as a balancing test, in reality where
a conflict arises one value (economic development versus
environmental protection) will have to be preferred. Petro-
leum provides our third most valuable export. A recent
report commissioned by the Ministry of Economic Devel-
opment anticipates the royalties from petroleum exploita-
tion over the next decade to be in the region of NZ$8.5 to
12.7 billion, if exploration is increased.9 Those figures do
not include any calculations as to the wider economic
benefits of the development of the New Zealand petroleum
industry. In the circumstances, the test is loaded in favour
of consenting to the exploration and exploitation of petro-
leum. Once consent is obtained, cl 59(5) of the Bill protects
the capital investment in any operation by favouring the
continuance of consents.
The Bill is interesting in making explicit reference to the
precautionary principle, but the legislature has chosen to
adopt a weak form of precaution by prescribing an adaptive
management approach to be taken in the event of uncer-
tainty. Clause 13 provides that:
(1) In achieving the purpose of this Act, a person per-
forming functions and duties or exercising powers
under it that affect the environment must—
(a) make full useof the information andother resources
available to it and of its powers to obtain informa-
tion and expert advice and commission research;
and
(b) base decisions on the best available information;
and
(c) take into account any uncertainty or inadequacy
in the information available.
(2) If, in relation to the making of a decision under this
Act that affects the environment, the information
available is uncertain or inadequate, the person must
favour caution and environmental protection.
(3) If favouring caution and environmental protection
means that an activity is likely to be a prohibited
activity or a marine consent is likely to be refused,
the person must first consider whether taking an
adaptivemanagement approachwould allow the activ-
ity to be undertaken.
(4) In this section, best available information means the
best information that, in the particular circum-
stances, is availablewithout unreasonable cost, effort,
or time.
An adaptive management approach is not suited to petro-
leum extraction. The likelihood is that petroleum explora-
tion and exploitation will continue apace, and consents are
unlikely to be refused. The emphasis must therefore be
upon ensuring that such activities are conducted in the
safest possible manner.
Interim Measures
At present there are no existing mining petroleum permits
in the EEZ but there are 18 current exploration permits. In
general, a petroleum exploration permit will only be granted
where the applicant’s work programme makes a commit-
ment to drill an exploration well within the duration of the
permit, and once the permit is granted the holder will be
under a legal obligation to drill.10 Given the likelihood of
exploratory wells being drilled prior to the enactment of the
legislation, the Government has issued proposals for an
interim regime.11 Operators will be requested to submit an
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Environmental Impact Assessment to the EPA before drill-
ing commences. The Government has stated that it will bear
the costs of preparing this document. Secondly, operators
are being asked to comply with the United States of Ameri-
ca’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and
Enforcement (BOEMRE) Drilling Safety Rule. Such mea-
sures cannot be imposed upon operators and they are
being asked to comply voluntarily, however it seems likely
that these standards will become requirements once the
legislation is enacted.
Fundamental Concerns
The requirement that offshore installations comply with the
US Drilling Safety Rule is a positive development. The
Drilling Safety Rule primarily contains a series of prescrip-
tive, technical requirements to address well bore integrity
and well control equipment to minimise the chance of a
blow-out, and was implemented in accordance with Secre-
tary Salazar’s report following the Gulf disaster.12 That
New Zealand is following the “lessons learnt” by the United
States is entirely positive, but it is vital that the Salazar
reforms are considered as a whole. A critical part of the
proposed reforms in the United States concern the neces-
sity for increased oversight by regulators. Before the Salazar
review, BOEMRE experts inspected a rig during construc-
tion and, once it was in location, every 30 days. Inspectors
conducted both announced and unannounced inspections
and were required to undertake comprehensive and sys-
tematic reviews at each inspection, and details as to the
inspections required are specified in the Departmental pro-
gram. However, this level of regulatory oversight was felt to
be inadequate. Following the review, BOEMRE is now pro-
viding teams of experts to undertake inspections and review-
ing processes to further improve oversight (inspectors will
have additional duties, for example directly witnessing tests
of all blowout preventer equipment). The resources and
expertise required to conduct this level of regulatory over-
sight is phenomenal and contrasts sharply with the situa-
tion in New Zealand. The Department of Labour is charged
with monitoring the activities of the petroleum industry, in
accordance with the Health and Safety in Employment
Act 1992. At present, New Zealand has one inspector to
manage all onshore and offshore petroleum and geothermal
activity. A recent independent consultant’s report com-
mented that:13
… the New Zealand inspectorate appears significantly
under-resourcedwith respect to regulatory review,moni-
toring, inspection and enforcement. This represents a
serious risk to the adequacy of the existing regulatory
regime to anticipate or prevent a major pollution inci-
dent from offshore petroleum operations.
The Department of Labour has confirmed that, “with only
one specialised resource working on petroleum, the cur-
rent inspector finds it difficult to achieve more than simply
reacting to issues raised by the industry”. But the Depart-
ment has also warned that increasing the number of inde-
pendent inspectors will prove challenging: the international
pool of expertise is small and companies and governments
internationally compete by offering high renumeration.14
Perhaps conscious of these difficulties, a recent Cabinet
Briefing paper envisaged that there will be “at least one
[planned] inspection per year for each manned installation,
where practicable.”15
Whilst the Bill allows the EPA to impose conditions on
marine consents that may include monitoring of the activ-
ity, it cannot “impose a condition to deal with an effect if
the conditions would have the same or a similar effect as, or
conflict with, a measure required in relation to the activity
by another marine management regime or the Health and
Safety in Employment Act 1992”.16 Thus the EPA will not be
able to use its statutory powers to remedy an inadequate
monitoring system that stems from a lack of prioritisation in
government funding.
Conclusion
The purpose and provisions of the Exclusive Economic Zone
and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Bill lean
towards the continuing exploration and exploitation of
New Zealand’s offshore petroleum reserves. The greatest
protection of our oceans will come with ensuring the integ-
rity of offshore installations and appropriate industry prac-
tices and procedures, and the lessons from the Gulf disaster
include the necessity of comprehensive regulatory over-
sight. Unless the Government is willing to address this
present flaw in administration, the implementation of the
new legislation will fall short of adequately promoting the
protection of our marine environment.
Footnotes
1. Crown Minerals Act 1991, s 22(1)(b); Minerals Programme
for Petroleum 2005 paras 2.10–2.18.
2. Crown Minerals Act 1991, s 25(1).
3. See for example PetroleumExploration Permit 52707 granted
to Petrobas, 1 June 2010, Schedule 1, General Conditions 1.
4. Health and Safety in Employment (Petroleum Exploration
and Extraction) Regulations 1999, reg 12.
5. Ibid regs 24, 25.
6. Vernon Rive “On balance: some preliminary observations
on the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf
(Environmental Effects) Bill 2011” (2011) 9 BRMB 63.
7. Note that an activitymust not be classified as permitted if, in
the Minister’s opinion, the activity is likely to have adverse
effects on the environment or an existing interest that are
“significant in the circumstances”, Exclusive Economic Zone
and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Bill 2011,
cl 29(4). It is unclear how “significant in the circumstances”
will be interpreted.
8. Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environ-
mental Effects) Bill 2011, cl 61(2).
9. WoodwardPartners“Valuationof theCrown’sRoyaltyStreams
from the Petroleum Estate”,March 2011, available at http://
www.med.govt.nz/templates/StandardSummary____4466
0.aspx. Note that this encompasses onshore and offshore
reserves although the greatest reserves are believed to be
offshore.
10. Minerals Programme for Petroleum 2005, paras 5.4.17,
5.4.47.
Copyright of the Resource Management Bulletin is the property of LexisNexis NZ Ltd and its content may not be 
copied, saved or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written 
permission. However, users may print, download or email articles for individual use. 
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3263844 
11. New Zealand Government Cabinet Paper “Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone and Extended Continental Shelf Environmental
Effects Legislation Interim Measures and Other Improve-
ments to the Regulatory Regime for Offshore Petroleum”,
27 July 2011.
12. “Increased SafetyMeasures for Energy Development on the
Outer Continental Shelf”, 27 May 2010, United States Gov-
ernment Department of the Interior.
13. Atkins Holm Joseph Majurey Ltd “Comparative Review of
Health, Safety and Environmental Legislation for Offshore
Petroleum Operations”, September 2010, Ministry of Eco-
nomic Development, Wellington, p 31.
14. Department of Labour “Practical Proposals for improving
the Department of Labour’s approach to High Hazard Indus-
tries” July 2011, Wellington, p 11–12.
15. New Zealand Government Cabinet Paper “Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone and Extended Continental Shelf Environmental
Effects Legislation Interim Measures and Other Improve-
ments to the Regulatory Regime for Offshore Petroleum”,
27 July 2011, p 15.
16. Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environ-
mental Effects) Bill 2011, cl 62(3).
Urban Spacemen
In this article Trevor Daya-Winterbottom considers the Auckland Plan that will introduce
spatial planning into the New Zealand context. Trevor Daya-Winterbottom is a Senior Lecturer
at the Centre for Environmental Resources and Energy Law, Faculty of Law, University of
Waikato
Introduction
This article considers the rationale for the proposedAuckland
Plan thatwill introduce spatial planning into theNewZealand
context. It examines the background to the plan in the
debate about Auckland governance, before considering
whether the planning framework under the Resource Man-
agement Act 1991 (RMA) could be used to achieve similar
outcomes in other regions without further statutory reform.
Auckland Plan
The discussion document outlining the strategic directions
and options for theAuckland Planwas launched on 23March
2011. Submissions closed on 31 May 2011 and the consulta-
tion draft of the Auckland Plan was issued on 20 September
2011. Following submissions and hearings it is anticipated
that the Auckland Plan will become operative in December
2011.
It is for note that the Auckland Plan is different from plan
preparation previously carried out under the Local Govern-
ment Act 2002 (LGA) or the RMA. The focus of the Auckland
Plan is long-term and firmly based on sustainability and it is
intended to influence “existing and future land use pat-
terns”;1 the “location of critical infrastructure”;2 and iden-
tify “nationally and regionally significant” ecological areas,
landscapes, open spaces, unstable land, landscapes, heri-
tage areas and natural features.3 In particular, the plan is
intended to address:4
… how Auckland might develop, including the sequenc-
ing of growth and provision of infrastructure. (Empha-
sis added)
To give effect to the “strategic direction” the plan will
include:5
… policies, priorities, programmes, and land alloca-
tions to … indicate how resources will be provided to
enable that to happen. (Emphasis added)
The Auckland Plan will therefore be a forward planning
document par excellence that will be implemented under
the LGA and the Auckland Governance legislation by the
Council’s long-term plan and funding and financial policies,
and under the RMA by the unitary plan that will be notified
by the Council in 2012.6 For example, the discussion docu-
ment advises that:7
Aspects of planning, design and service provision (e.g.
land use zones, water, waste) can have profound impacts
on the economic performance of Auckland. The spatial
arrangements ultimately set out in the Auckland Plan
must link with the vision to enable Auckland to excel
globally. Auckland’s future form must capitalise on the
city’s distinctiveness and core competitive strengths to
provide for long-term strategic and sustainable eco-
nomic development.
In addition to the linkages between growth and infrastruc-
ture provision, the plan will also enable the Council to
integrate land use zoning and transport planning, as the
Regional Land Transport Strategy and Programme will also
give effect to the Auckland Plan.
What is spatial planning?
Options for spatial planning were set out in the Cabinet
paper recording decisions taken by the Cabinet Committee
on Implementation of Auckland Governance Reforms on
15 October 2009.8 Spatial plans are an entirely new plan-
ning method in the New Zealand context, and were defined
by the Cabinet paper as having the following attributes:
4. … Internationally, spatial plans layout a long-term,
strategic direction for a region and its communities,
including social, economic, cultural and environmental
objectives and articulate the region’s role in the country.
This direction enables effective management of rapid
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